Why should aggregate investment of large conglomerates depend on personal characteristics of one single person, the CEO? In reality, decision processes are complex. Are personal characteristics of all senior managers together perhaps a better predictor of corporate decisions than the CEOs' characteristics alone? This is the question we tackle in this paper empirically for the case of managerial optimism and corporate investment. In contrast to existing empirical studies we do not only focus on optimism measures of single managers like the CEO or CFO of a firm as investment decisions of firms are usually not made by only one single person. Instead, our optimism measure is based on the insider stock transaction behavior of all senior managers that they have to report to the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. The main results can be summarized as follows. Managers are optimistic. Managers voluntarily increase their exposure to company specific risk more often than they reduce it, although they should, if anything, reduce their exposure. Furthermore, we find that firms with optimistic managers invest more. Moreover, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for firms with optimistic managers. Consistent with theory, these results are stronger for financially constrained firms. As new insights, we find that optimism of all insiders has also explanatory power when compared to pure CEO optimism and that the higher managerial optimism, the lower the excess value of a company. We also identify moderating variables that determine when the CEO is more relevant for corporate investment (firm size, corporate governance, type of investment). CFO optimism has no explanatory power. These findings show that it is crucial to analyze how the exact decision process works within a firm. 
Introduction
Why should aggregate investment of large conglomerates depend on personal characteristics of one single person, the CEO? In reality, decision processes are complex. The starting point when analyzing corporate investment is usually that a firm's investment should only depend on the profitability of its investment opportunities as measured by, e.g., Tobin's Q (Modigliani and Miller (1958) ). Investment should not depend on the firm's mix of debt and equity financing, cash flow or liquidity, or financial market conditions. However, the evidence over the last 30 years shows that investment depends on profitability (Tobin's Q) but also on cash flow. This is called "investment-cash flow dependence" or "investment-cash flow sensitivity" (see Hubbard (1998) and ). As a consequence, new theories have been proposed which predict that investment is sensitive to the amount of cash in the firm. In agency theories, managers overinvest to reap private benefits. External capital markets limit the extent to which managers can pursue these goals. An influx of cash flow leads to the result that managers invest too much. According to asymmetric information theories, managers themselves restrict external financing to avoid issuing undervalued shares. Cash flow increases investment and thus reduces underinvestment. However, these theories do not explain reality very well. summarizes this current state of the literature as follows: "What we know: Firms with more cash invest more. What we don't know: Why firms with more cash invest more."
Recently, behavioral corporate finance theories have been proposed that are based on managerial biases to explain corporate investment. Why should behavioral finance be useful in explaining corporate decisions? There is a huge behavioral finance literature in asset pricing and investor behavior. However, there is only little (empirical) research in behavioral corporate finance, mainly due to data limitations. This is striking as behavioral factors might be more relevant in firms since there are no arbitrage arguments, that are put forth to argue that biases are eliminated, for example, in capital markets. Furthermore, there is infrequent noisy feedback in corporations when compared to financial markets which hinders learning.
For example, models have been proposed that are based on managerial optimism. Examples are Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2005a) . In these models, managerial optimism is modeled as follows. Managers overestimate the return of investment or the profitability of success. Managers think that shares of their company are undervalued.
A direct implication is that managers invest too much, i.e. more than in the first-best situation. However, this is difficult to test empirically as the first-best situation (optimal level) is not observable. But there are further hypotheses to test. In the case of optimistic managers, the intended investment level of these managers is higher than the first best level. If the firm is financially constrained, the firm cannot increase debt to finance investment. However, equity is also not an option as optimistic managers think that the own shares are undervalued. To summarize, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher in firms with optimistic managers and this effect is stronger for financially constrained (equity dependent) firms. Therefore, we can formulate the following two hypotheses that we will also test in our paper (see Malmendier and Tate (2005a) 
Prediction 2: The investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms with optimistic managers is more pronounced in equity-dependent (financially constrained) firms.
In other words, the link between optimism and investment is stronger in equity-dependent (financially constrained) firms. The intuition is that in these firms the proportion of cash flow financing is higher. Thus, the external capital markets cannot limit effects of managerial optimism. This argument is similar in agency models.
Testing these models empirically is still at an early stage and only few papers are available. Malmendier and Tate (2005a) analyze U.S. data and construct an optimism measure based on executive stock option exercise behavior and on stock transactions behavior of CEOs. A CEO who is buying additional company stock is classified as optimistic. Malmendier and Tate (2005b) also analyze U.S. data and construct an optimism measure based on press portrays of CEO. Lin, Hu, and Chen (2005) analyze data from Taiwan.
Their measure is calculated using earnings forecasts of managers. All three studies confirm 2 See Shefrin (2005) for a textbook treatment.
the above predictions. Furthermore, Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2006) calculate optimism and overconfidence measures of CFOs based on the Duke/CFO Business Outlook survey. They find that firms with overconfident CFOs (i.e., CFOs with a narrow confidence interval) invest more. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns. Overconfidence measures are based on high order acquisition deals and insider dealings. They find that overconfident bidders realize lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long-term performance. Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that the probability of making an acquisition is higher if the CEO of a firm is classified as overconfident. The effect is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. Furthermore, the market reaction at merger announcement is significantly more negative than for non-overconfident CEOs.
One big disadvantage of most of these studies is that they only focus on one person in the company, such as the CEO or the CFO. However, it is not intuitive why aggregate corporate investment should only be driven by biases of only one single person in the company. In practice, investment decisions are usually not only made by one single person in a company. Furthermore, investments under a threshold which is often about 2.5 million Euros in large European companies are usually made by lower level managers without consulting members of the executive board.
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And even large investment decisions are not only made by the CEO or the CFO alone. We overcome this shortcoming by constructing optimism measures that are based on a broader group of managers and which make use of managers' insider stock trades. The logic is similar to one of the Malmendier and Tate Furthermore, our research is also related to recent studies that analyze the importance of chief executive officers for firm outcomes (see, e.g., Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007) or Westerberg, Singh, and Häckner (1997) ) or the link between managerial characteristics and corporate decisions (see, e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) , and Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2007) ). Moreover, our study is related to research that analyzes the link between insider trades and corporate actions or, in other words, how much directors know about the future of their company (see, for example, Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) or Ravina and Sapienza (2006) ).
The main results can be summarized as follows. Managers are optimistic. Managers voluntarily increase their exposure to company specific risk more often than they reduce it, although they should, if anything, reduce their exposure. Furthermore, we find that firms with optimistic managers invest more. Moreover, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for firms with optimistic managers. Consistent with theory, these results are stronger for financially constrained firms. As new insights, we find that optimism of all insiders has also explanatory power when compared to pure CEO optimism and that the higher managerial optimism, the lower the excess value of a company. We also iden-tify moderating variables that determine when the CEO is more relevant for corporate investment (firm size, corporate governance, type of investment). CFO optimism has no explanatory power. These findings show that it is crucial to analyze how the exact decision process works within a firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our sample of firms and explain the balance sheet and stock market data as well as the Directors' Dealings data. Furthermore, we show how we calculate the optimism measures used in this paper. Section 3 presents the basic results on optimism and corporate investment and analyzes whether firms with optimistic managers invest more when other variables are controlled for. Section 4 contains the empirical evaluation of Hypothesis 1, i.e. whether firms with optimistic managers exhibit a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity when compared to firms with managers who are not classified as optimistic. Section 5 presents results on Hypothesis 2 and analyzes whether the sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flow is indeed higher for firms with optimistic managers. Section 6 answers the question of whether managerial optimism leads to inefficiencies by analyzing the valuation consequences of the fact that managers are optimistic. Section 7 discusses alternative explanations of our results and the last section concludes. Our main data source for balance sheet and stock price data is the Datastream/Worldscope database. This is the primary data source of studies analyzing corporate decisions in Europe (see, for example, Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2006) ). However also studies analyzing U.S. firms sometimes also use this database (see, for example (Cleary 1999) ). Table 1 shows a list of variables we gather.
The main variables we analyze are capital expenditures (additions to fixed assets; Worldscope data item WC04601) divided by lagged assets (WC02999), cash flow (EBIT plus depreciation; WC18191+ WC01151) divided by lagged assets, and Tobin's Q.
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We calculate Tobin's Q as in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) : Q is the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding) plus assets minus the book value of equity all over assets. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of some variables for the firms in our sample. All 5 The CDAX covers all German shares admitted to the highest market segments (currently, the Prime Standard and General Standard segments, an in earlier years the Amtlicher Handel). Therefore, the index reflects the performance of the overall German equity market, and is consequently well suited for analytic purposes. See http://deutsche-boerse.com. 6 All results are similar when we scale our variables by lagged total capital (WC03998), net property, plant, and equipment (WC02501), or sales (WC01001). Furthermore, our results hold for different cash flow definitions.
variables show similar patters compared to those shown in other studies.
Directors' Dealings Data
As already mentioned above, our optimism measures are based on transactions of members of the Executive and Supervisory Board on their personal accounts. Insiders have to report their trades to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bafin). For former New Market stocks, this rule was introduced on March 1st, 2001 and for all other firms on July 1st, 2002. These rules are similar to the U.S. rules. All insider trades must be reported to the SEC. Table 3 gives an example of these Meldungen nach §15a WpHG (Directors' Dealings) that can be downloaded from the web page of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bafin), www.bafin.de, or from the commercial web page www.insiderdaten.de. 676 transactions included in this data set either have a zero stock price or volume or cannot definitely be classified as voluntary trades considering the description attached to the transaction. Therefore, in a second data set, these transactions were excluded and results from its analysis were used for robustness check. All results presented in the paper hold for both sets of transactions. Table 4 shows the number of purchases and sales as well as the average volume of purchases and sales in Euro broken down by members of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board of the companies in our data set. For both the Executive Board and Supervisory Board members, the average sales volume in Euro is larger than the average purchase volume. However, for both groups, the number of purchases is higher than the number of sales. Thus, there are many cases in which managers voluntarily increase their exposure to company specific risk.
To our knowledge, insider trading data has not been linked to corporate investment decisions in the way we do it so far. Usually, studies analyze whether insider trades are
informative. An example is Lakonishok and Lee (2001) . They find little market movement when insiders trade and when they report their trades to the SEC. Furthermore, insiders in aggregate are contrarian investors. However, they predict market movements better than simple contrarian strategies. Insiders also seem to be able to predict cross-sectional stock returns. The result, however, is driven by insider's ability to predict returns in smaller firms. For the German stock market, Rau (2004) finds a small market movement in the days after announcement of insider trades. 
Optimism Measures
Based on transactions described in the previous subsection, we construct four measures of optimism. After assigning the directors' dealings to each company, we assess for each year and company the number of purchases, the number of sales, the volume of purchases, and the volume of sales. Thereupon, we accumulate on an annual basis the number of purchases and sales and the volume of purchases and sales. Thereby we receive an annual "number-" and "volume"-variable (see Table 5 for details). We call these variables 7 Similar results are obtained by Betzer and Theissen (2008) and Dymke and Walter (2008) For opt number,EB+SB , the median is 0, and the mean is positive (0.1577). This is no surprise given the larger number of purchases than sales as shown on Table 4 . For opt volume,EB+SB , the median is 0 Euro and the mean is − 414,034.9 Euro. (1) to (8) and (capex-industry capex)/industry capex in Regressions (9)-(11). In all regressions, we analyze cash flow divided by lagged assets and lagged Tobin's Q as control variables. In Regressions (6) to (8), we also include the leverage ratio, the natural logarithm of total assets, and sales growth as explanatory variables. In Regressions (3) to (11), we also include an optimism dummy variable. The dummy variable is equal to 1 when members of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board (ALL), only the Executive Board (EB), or only CEO are classified as optimistic in a given year.
In Regressions (1) and (2), we replicate results of prior studies on determinants of corporate investment decisions. Investment is positively related to cash flow and Tobin's Q.
In Regressions (3) to (11), we include our optimism measures. In all regressions, the sign of these variables is positive. In Regressions (5), (8), (10), and (11), the dummy variables are significant at least at the 10 % level. Thus, our first result is that firms with optimistic managers invest more, even when other variables are controlled for. Table 7 shows that the strongest results can be found for CEO optimism. The weakest relation between managerial optimism and corporate investment is found for CFO optimism (not reported throughout the paper).
8 Table 8 shows fixed effects panel regression results of capital expenditures on several control variables for large firms (Regressions (1) to (6)) and small firms ( (7) to (12)).
Large firms have above median total asset values, small firms have below median total asset values. The dependent variable is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets in Regressions (1) to (3) and (7) to (9) and (capex-industry capex)/industry capex in
Regressions (4) to (6) and (10) to (12). This table shows that the effects of managerial optimism on corporate investment are mainly driven by smaller firms. Table 9 shows fixed effects panel regression results of capital expenditures divided by lagged assets on several control variables for firms with varying degrees of closely held shares (in percent of shares outstanding) as proxy for ownership structure. This variable represents shares held by insiders. It includes but is not restricted to shares held by officers, directors and their immediate families, shares held in trust, shares of the company held by any other corporation, or shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. Table 9 shows that managerial optimism mainly affects corporate investment in firms with a low number of closely held shares and (less strong) in firms with a high number of closely held shares. Managerial optimism is never linked to corporate investment in firms in the middle tercile of closely held shares. Table 10 replicates these results for (capex-industry capex)/industry capex as dependent variable. Morck, Shleifer, 8 The results are similar but less strong when the other optimism measures based in transactions or volume are included.
One reason might be that a higher number of purchases may simply be driven by a large board. However, we are not able to control for board size. A similar logic applies to the volume measure.
and Vishny (1988) find a similar nonmonotonic relationship between management ownership and market valuation of a firm, as measured by Tobin's Q. Table 11 shows fixed effects logit panel regression results of a mergers and acquisitions dummy variable on several control variables. The dependent variable is set equal to one if the "assets from acquisitions" variable is positive in a given year which happens in 32 percent of all cases (firm years). In all regressions, we analyze cash flow divided by lagged assets, lagged Tobin's Q, and the natural logarithm of total assets as control variables. In
Regressions (3) to (5), we also include an optimism dummy variable. Table 11 shows that cash flow, Tobin's Q, and firm size mainly drive the probability of an acquisition. This result is consistent with prior research (see, for example, Malmendier and Tate (2008)).
All optimism variables are positively related with the probability of an acquisition, but only the optimism variable that is based on all insiders shows up significantly. We note, however, that due to the low number of observations we are not able to explore this in greater detail. To summarize, we find that managerial optimism explains corporate investment even when other variables are controlled for. The effect is mainly driven by CEO optimism in the case of capital expenditures. However, optimism of other managers has also explanatory power. The effects of managerial optimism on capital expenditures is especially strong in small firms and stocks with a low percentage of closely held shares. In contrast to capital expenditures, CEO optimism has no explanatory power for acquisitions. For acquisitions, optimism of all managers significantly increases the probability of an acquisitions whereas CEO optimism alone does not.
Optimistic versus Non-Optimistic Managers
Prediction 1 postulated that investment of firms with optimistic managers is more sensitive to cash flow than the investment of firms with managers who are not optimistic. We test this hypothesis in Table 12 . This table shows fixed effects panel regression results of capital expenditures on several control variables for firms whose managers are classified as not optimistic (Regressions (1), (3), and (5)) and optimistic (Regressions (2), (4), and (6)).
The dependent variable is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets. In all regressions,
we analyze cash flow divided by lagged assets and lagged Tobin's Q as control variables.
The table shows that the investment cash flow sensitivity is always higher for firms with optimistic managers. The largest difference in coefficients is found for CEOs. We thus confirm prior findings of Malmendier and Tate (2005a), Malmendier and Tate (2005b), and Lin, Hu, and Chen (2005) . We are thus able to confirm Hypothesis 1. Interestingly, Tobin's Q is not significant in regressions for optimistic managers. This can be interpreted in the way that in such firms with biased managers, rational factors such as expected investment profitability (as measured by Tobin's Q) are not relevant for decisions.
Financial Constraints and the Effects of Managerial Optimism

The Measurement of Financial Constraints
One of the key predictions of the literature is that the link between optimism and corporate investment is more pronounced in equity-dependent or financially constrained firms.
Studies usually use an index based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) In the present paper, we choose the following approach. We use the Kaplan-Zingales-index and the Whited-Wu-index to capture the different interpretation of financial constraints mentioned above (high need for funds as well as high costs of external funds). Although these indexes have been calibrated for U.S. stocks, they are also used to rank firms in Europe. For example, Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2006) , p. 20-27, identify financially constrained firms in Germany and the rest of Europe using the Kaplan-Zingales index. Glaser and Hirn (2007) show that this procedure is justified as these indexes yield similar results when German stocks are ranked and the characteristics of these firms over financial constraints quantiles are compared to the respective U.S. values. As a third financial constraint measure, we use the Cleary-index. Cleary (1999) divides his sample of U.S. stocks into three categories: Group 1 firms which increase dividends and are likely not financially constrained; Group 2 firms which cut dividends and are likely financially constrained and Group 3 firms which do not change dividend payments. He then performs a discriminant analysis to discover firm characteristics that are related with the above classification of firms. While Group 3 firms are not used for purposes of discriminant analysis, they are assigned financial constraints scores. We calculate a similar score for Germany (see below for details). As Cleary (1999) does not use firm size in his discriminant analysis and as Hennessy and Whited (2007) find large differences between the cost of external funds for small and large firms, we calculate a fourth constraint measure which uses the original variables proposed in Cleary (1999) and additionally includes firm size. In the following, we call this index "own index". Overall, we expect that our index might be the best index
to rank German firms to analyze the link between managerial optimism and corporate investment for financially constrained firms for the following reasons: The index is calibrated for Germany and it includes firm size to capture one important facet of financial constraints: high costs of external funds. However, as Hennessy and Whited (2007) note, such indexes might not work well to identify firms with high need for funds, e.g. as a result of lots of high NPV projects. However, we argue that in tests of the effect of managerial optimism on corporate investment for financially constrained firms this fact is less severe as optimistic managers think their firm has lots of high NPV projects although this might not be the case in reality.
To be more precise, the Kaplan-Zingales-index based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
To calculate the Cleary (1999) index with German coefficients, we run the following Probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm increases dividends and 0 for firms which cut dividends. As in Cleary (1999) , this variable is regressed on the current ratio, fixed charge coverage, financial slack divided by lagged capital, the net income margin, sales growth, and the debt ratio.
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Variables are defined in Table 1 . To create the index, we use all coefficients of variables that are significant at the 5 percent level (see Table 13 ). To calculate our own index, we simply add the natural logarithm of total assets as further explanatory variable. Table 14 shows descriptive statistics of various firm characteristics for constraints terciles 9 Calculating the coefficients using a discriminant analysis yields similar results.
that are based on all for indexes mentioned above. The results confirm prior literature (see Glaser and Hirn (2007) ). For example, constrained firms have a lower profitability, a lower payout ratio, and are more likely to be financially distressed.
To test Hypothesis 2, we cannot split the sample in optimistic and non-optimistic managers and run regressions for the most constrained firms and compare the investment-cash flow sensitivity as was done in Section 4. The reason is that Glaser and Hirn (2007) show for Germany that firms with the highest financial constraints do not exhibit the highest investment-cash flow sensitivity. One explanation is that among firms that are financially constrained there are some firms that are financially distressed and do not invest at all.
This finding is consistent with Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , Cleary (1999) , Cleary (2006) , and the interpretation in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (2000) . Thus, we follow the approach of Malmendier and Tate (2005a) and regress investment on optimism*cash flow for financially constraint firms. The results are presented in the next subsection.
Financial Constraints and the Effects of Managerial Optimism: Results
Prediction 2 stated that the investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms with optimistic managers is more pronounced in equity-dependent (financially constrained) firms. We test this prediction in Table 15 . This table shows fixed effects panel regression results of capital expenditures on several control variables for the one third of all stocks with the highest financial constraints as identified by the Kaplan-Zingales-Index, the Whited-WuIndex, the Cleary-Index (with own coefficients), and our own index. See Subsection 5.1
and The first observation is that the financially constrained firms analyzed in Table 15 indeed have lower investment cash flow sensitivities than we observe for our whole sample (see Table 7 ). This result confirms Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , Cleary (1999) , Cleary (2006), and Glaser and Hirn (2007) . Furthermore, the optimism*cash flow variable is significant in all regressions when optimism is based on CEO transactions. This finding strengthens the point that CEOs matter for corporate outcomes (see also Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007)). In Regressions (10) to (12) in which financially constrained firms are identified by the presumably most appropriate index as was argued in the last subsection, all optimism*cash flow variables are significantly related with capital expenditures.
The results are similar when lagged constraint measures are included. This result is not surprising given the fact that there is some persistence of the ranking of firms over time (see Glaser and Hirn (2007) ). Unreported regression results show that this is never the case for the other two constraints terciles. We are thus able to confirm Hypothesis 2.
Valuation Consequences of Managerial Optimism
In this subsection, we analyze whether managerial optimism is associated with inefficiencies that lead to lower market valuation of firms. Table 16 shows coefficient estimates from regressions of excess value on a focused-firm indicator and control variables such as in Berger and Ofek (1995) , Table 3 . Excess value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual value to its imputed value. A firm's imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, with each segment's imputed value equal to the segment's sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to that accounting item (see Glaser and Müller (2007) for details on business segment data and the diversification discount in Germany). Control variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, capital expenditures divided by sales, and EBIT divided by sales. In Regressions (4) to (6) we include our optimism dummy variables. In Regressions (7) to (9) we include lagged values of our optimism dummy variables. Regression (1) shows a pooled OLS regression, Regression (2) is a fixed effects panel regression without year fixed effects. Regressions (3) to (9) show fixed effects panel regression with year fixed effects.
The results are similar to those presented in Berger and Ofek (1995) . Table 16 shows that diversification per se does not seem to be the reason for the diversification discount. When fixed effects regressions are run, the focused-dummy is not significant anymore. Glaser and Müller (2007) analyze the reasons for the diversification discount and its disappearance once firm fixed effects are included in detail. Table 16 shows that, the higher managerial optimism, the lower the excess value. This result is robust across all optimism measures. This result is not consistent with insider trading based on private information as managers are not correct with their expectations.
Lagged optimism variables also have a negative sign although they are not significant anymore (Regressions (7) to (9)).
However, the results are consistent with the following interpretation. In some firms, managers are biased. These managers make corporate decisions that are harmful for the firm.
Our findings throughout the paper are consistent with the interpretation that overinvestment due to managerial optimism is one explanation for the observed lower excess value.
However, this does not seem to be the whole story, as all optimism measures are highly negatively correlated with excess value whereas the link between optimism and corporate investment is less strong. Thus, managerial biases also seem to affect other corporate decisions to the detriment of the firm.
Evaluation of Alternative Explanations
Two other explanations for the link between managerial optimism and corporate investment are insider trading based on private insider information and signaling. We discuss these potential explanations in turn.
A CEO may decide to increase exposure to company risk because of private information about future stock prices that makes buying stocks attractive. Inside information also predicts investment-cash flow sensitivity. Since the information has not been incorporated into the market price, the firms stock is undervalued and investment may be sensitive to cash flow for the usual Myers and Majluf (1984) reasons (see also Malmendier and Tate (2005a) . One of the key distinctions between (over-)optimism and correct, private inside information is success in later periods, on average. However, this not consistent with the results presented in Table 16 .
Another reason why CEOs may want to hold company risk is to convey a (potentially) costly signal to the capital market that their firms prospects are better than the prospects of similar firms. However, the most natural version of the signaling story would not predict heightened investment cash flow sensitivity (see Malmendier and Tate (2005a) . Signaling should alleviate informational asymmetries and, thus, eliminate investment-cash flow sensitivity among the firms in which CEOs hold their stocks. Thus, the tests of our investment predictions themselves will help to dispel this alternative explanation.
Discussion and Conclusion
In our study, we empirically analyzed the link between corporate investment and managerial optimism. In contrast to existing empirical studies we did not only focus on optimism measures of single managers like the CEO or CFO of a firm as investment decisions of firms are usually not made by only a single person. Instead, our optimism measure was based on the insider stock transaction behavior of managers that they have to report to the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. The main results can be summarized as follows. Managers are optimistic. Managers voluntarily increase their exposure to company specific risk more often than they reduce it, although they should, if anything, reduce their exposure. Furthermore, we find that firms with optimistic managers invest more. Moreover, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for firms with optimistic managers. Consistent with theory, these results are stronger for financially constrained firms. We are thus able to confirm behavioral corporate finance models.
The results are consistent with the following interpretation. In some firms, managers are biased. These managers make corporate decisions that are harmful for the firm. Our findings throughout the paper are consistent with the interpretation that overinvestment due to managerial optimism is one explanation for the observed lower excess value. However, this does not seem to be the whole story, as all optimism measures are highly negatively correlated with excess value whereas the link between optimism and corporate investment is less strong. . Then, the table shows whether a specific transaction was a buy or sell transaction, the number of stocks traded, the price and the total volume in Euro of the transaction. First of all, we code a purchase of stocks of the own company by insiders as 1 and a sale as −1 (see the column Buy/Sell indicator). Per year and firm, we then sum this indicator variable. The sum of these indicator variables is the optimism measure based on the number of transactions (see the lines that are indicated with in the last column). To calculate the optimism measure based on volume we first multiply the volume of a transaction (1) with the Buy/Sell indicator. Then, we sum (1)*(2) per firm and year (see the lines that are indicated with in the last column). These measures represent the optimism measures in a given year. This table presents the correlation of optimism variables, the significance level (in parentheses) as well as the number of observations used in calculating the variables. Based on transactions described in subsection 2.2, we construct measures of optimism as follows. After assigning the directors' dealings to each company, we assess for each year and company the number of purchases, the number of sales, the volume of purchases and the volume of sales. Thereupon, we accumulated on an annual basis the number of purchases and sales and the volume of purchases and sales. Thereby we receive an annual "number-" and "volume"-variable (see Table 5 for details). We call these variables opt number,EB+SB and opt volume,EB+SB . These optimism measures are based on the transactions of Executive Board and Supervisory Board members. We also calculate additional optimism measures that are only based on transactions of Executive Board members. We call these variables opt number,EB and opt volume,EB . The respective variables for the CEO and the CFO are defined similarly.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 2466 1 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1324) (0.0000) (0.0000) 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 (1) to (8) and (capex-industry capex)/industry capex in Regressions (9) to (11).
In all regressions, we analyze cash flow divided by lagged assets and lagged Tobin's Q as control variables. In Regressions (6) to (8), we also include the leverage ratio, the natural logarithm of total assets, and sales growth as explanatory variables. In Regressions (3) to (11), we also include an optimism dummy variable. The dummy variable is equal to 1 when members of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board (ALL), only the Executive Board (EB), or only CEO are classified as optimistic in a given year. See Table 5 
(8) (1) to (6)) and small firms ( (7) to (12)). Large firms have above median total asset values, small firms have below median total asset values. The dependent variable is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets in Regressions (1) to (3) and (7) to (9) and (capex-industry capex)/industry capex in Regressions (4) to (6) and (10) to (12).
In all regressions, we analyze cash flow divided by lagged assets and lagged Tobin's Q as control variables. Furthermore, we also include an optimism dummy variable. The dummy variable is equal to 1 when members of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board (ALL), only the Executive Board (EB), or only CEO are classified as optimistic in a given year. See Table 5 
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(8) This table shows coefficient estimates from regressions of excess value on a focused-firm indicator and control variables such as in Berger and Ofek (1995) , Table 3 . Excess value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firms actual value to its imputed value. A firms imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, with each segments imputed value equal to the segments sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to that accounting item. Control variables are rge natural logarithm of total assets, capital expenditures divided by sales, and EBIT devided by sales. In Regressions (4) to (6) we include our optimism dummy variables. In Regressions (7) to (9) we include lagged values of our optimism dummy variables. Regression (1) shows a pooled OLS regression, Regression (2) 
